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ABSTRACT 
Title of Research paper:    Study on Safety Escort of LNG Carriers in Port 
Water Area 
Degree:                               MSc 
 
In this research paper, the properties of LNG and the specialties of LNG carrier are 
firstly introduced. Then, the data of 170 LNG carrier accidents collected from 1964 
to 2017 are analyzed, and the conclusion of most accidents happened in port is 
drawn.  
 
Simultaneously, the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is carried out to analyze the 
navigational risks of LNG carriers and to prove the conclusion. Furthermore, it is 
concluded that the risk of collision between LNG carriers and merchant ships is a 
medium risk and should be controlled. It is decided to reduce the probability of 
collision by establishing a Moving Safety Zone around LNG carriers, and to mitigate 
the severity of consequences of the accident by setting the Leakage Hazard Zone, 
and to protect the two zones by means of tugs or boast escort.  
 
Through the studies on the theory of Ship Domain and the empirical coefficient, the 
mathematical model of Moving Safety Zone is introduced, by which the scope of 
Moving Safety Zone can be quantitatively calculated and obtained. On the other hand, 
the pool fire experimental results of Sandia National Labs are used to classify 3 
categories of Leaking Hazard Zones of LNG carrier. Finally, the general standards, 
requirements, plans and supports for tugs or boats escort are recommended to 
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LNG, as an efficient and clean energy, has drawn great attentions of most countries 
around the world. The LNG shipping industry also flourished with the energy 
demand, environmental protection requirements, technological upgrading and 
regional inequalities of resource distribution. From the first LNG commercial 
shipments in 1964 (CH • IV international [CH • IV], 2014, p.3), to the end of 2016, 
the number of LNG fleets has increased to 478 carriers, and the total transport 
volume has reached 69,300,000 m3, covering the world's major energy consuming 
countries and regions (The International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers 
[GIIGNL], 2017, p.12). However, as a way of energy transport, the hazards and 
potential risks of LNG carriers facing are more serious than other ships. Although 
there has not been a record of a total loss of ship or a death of crewmember in the 
course of LNG shipping history (CH • IV, 2014, p.3), the accidents caused by the 
inadvertent storage and transport of LNG on land are harrowing. In 1944, a LNG 
tank damage occurred in the United States Cleveland and the LNG vapor ignited and 
exploded, killing 128 people and 225 injured (CH • IV, 2014, p.6). In 1973, an 




United States, which resulted in 40 lives instantly disappear (CH • IV, 2014, p.9). 
These painful accidents have always reminded us, to this energy beast, we must 
always maintain awe. In the chain of LNG mining, refining, transportation, storage 
and use, even a tiny negligence is not allowed. Especially for the LNG shipment, the 
crew and carriers face with a more critical environment, the safety requirements and 
standards should be more rigorous. 
1.2 Objective 
The author of this paper is a 10 years experienced port VTS officer, who has an 
insightful understanding to the traffic safety and risk management of LNG carrier. In 
order to perfect his own work and provide referable experiences, the author 
extensively studied all aspects of the LNG shipping industry chain, and found that 
the current studies on LNG carriers safety mainly focus on the LNG carrier 
construction, LNG cargo storage, port loading and unloading operations and safety 
management, etc., yet the navigational safety of LNG carriers during in port were 
considered less. As a result, the author finally chose the topic “Study on Safety 
Escort of LNG Carriers in Port Water Area” as the research direction. For the 
high-risk cargo transportation, although there is a good safety record before, the risks 
of LNG shipment would not disappear before unloading from ships. Any negligence 
may lead to a chain reaction and eventually lead to disaster. Especially in the port 
water area, the navigable waters are limited, the hydrological and meteorological 
conditions are complicated, the densely populated areas are nearby, and the 
ecological environment is fragile. In addition, in recent years, the number and 
volume of LNG carriers have increased significantly; the navigational safety of LNG 
carriers in port has become a very sensitive and cannot be ignored problem. At 
present, effective and reasonable ship escort should be one of the best external safety 




1.3 The current studies 
Internationally, people has accumulated a great deal of experience in the safety 
management of LNG carrier, LNG terminal management, cargo handling operations 
and personnel training, and technologies and norms are becoming more integrated. 
And many authoritative industry organizations such as the Oil Companies 
International Marine Forum (OCIMF) and some of the ship classification societies 
have published a number of LNG carrier transport-related technical standards and 
operational guidelines. 
 
The International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers (GIIGNL) had studied 
the frequency of accidents and the amount of cargo leakage that occurred in the LNG 
industry during the period 1965-2007. The results showed that the indicators have 
been reduced to a lower point after 2000; the main causes of the accident were 
improper operation and improper equipment maintenance; the most of accidents 
happened in the process of LNG loading and unloading; Earthquakes, typhoons and 
other force majeure have little effect on the accidents occurrence. (Anthony & 
Deborah & Pierre, 2013, p. 17) 
 
Erik Vanem et al. Collected 182 LNG carrier accidents from 1964 to 2006, divided 
them into eight types of risk models, quantified the risks by using event tree method, 
and found that the risks were mainly concentrated in collision, grounding, fire or 
explosion and loading or unloading accidents, in which the collision is the highest 
risk value. The study concluded that the risks of LNG carrier transport are within 
acceptable scope. (Vanema, Antaob, Østvikc, & Comas, 2008, p. 134) 
 




of the University of Texas publish LNG Industrial Safety Accident Statistic s at 
regular intervals. The statistics on LNG carrier accidents indicate that LNG carriers 
had maintained a good safety record, no large-scale leakage occurred. (Center for 
Energy Economics [CEE], 2012, p.5) 
 
In the report of "FSA, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Carriers - Details of the Formal 
Safety Assessment" (MSC 83 / INF.3) submitted by the Danish Government to IMO 
in 2007, the 158 LNG carriers accidents occurred during transport were collected. 
Through Formal Safety Assessment (FSA), the main risks are identified, analyzed 
and controlled, and the control options are evaluated and the recommendations are 
put forward. Not only provided the risk control options for LNG carrier 
transportation, but also provided a scientific risk assessment method. (International 
Maritime Organization [IMO], 2007, p.3) 
 
The Moving Safety Zone in this paper is defined as that in the process of LNG 
carrier navigating in port, in order to ensure the safe navigation, a certain area of 
waters is set around it, which is a controlled area, other ships are prohibited from 
entering. The scope of the area shall be related to the ship's maneuvering abilities, the 
cargo hazards and the port navigational environment; the Leaking Hazard Zone is 
defined as a dangerous area established after the occurrence of LNG carrier's 
accident, if other unrelated ships and persons enter the area, they would suffer threats 
to their own safety. The scope of the area is related to the severity of the accident, the 
hazard extent of cargo and natural environment, etc.  
 
In the article "Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Infrastructure Security: Background and 
Issues for Congress", Paul W. Parfomak referred to the safety zone and guard zone 




response to terrorist threats. And the scopes of these areas were described; 
meanwhile the necessary security measures were required to protect them. (Paul, 
2003, p. 13) 
 
In 2009, Professor Jamin Koo et al. used the event tree method to study the safety 
issues of LNG receiving stations. Through the risk analysis software PHAST, they 
simulated the accidental leakage of LNG, and obtain the dimensions of safety zone 
and explosive hazard zone. (Koo, Kim, So, & Yoon, 2009, p.330) 
 
In 2012, Doctor Michelle Michot Foss released the article of "LNG safety and 
security". In this research report, some of the properties of LNG were summarized, 
and proposed to establish a safety zone to protect LNG carriers, including the safety 
measures, as well as the factors which would influence the establishment of a safety 
zone. (CEE, 2012, p.39) 
 
From 2008 to 2011, Sandia National Lab (the United States), according to the request 
from The National Energy Board, carried out a series of experiments and 
computational simulations for LNG carrier leakage, including containment system 
damage and leaking analysis, tank hole size analysis after collision, large scale LNG 
fire test, LNG hull steel plate low temperature damage analysis and LNG carrier joint 
damage analysis, the results provide a comprehensive LNG leakage accident related 
data. It is concluded that the hazard area of the LNG carrier can be determined 
according to the heat flux within a certain period and area. (United States 
Department of Energy [DOE], 2012, p.22) 
 
In 2013, Henryk Sniegocki gave a comprehensive application of SIGTTO's 




waters, VTS, traffic separation scheme, moving safety zone and ship speed limits. 
Finally, he recommended that people should follow the SIGTTO requirements and 
recommendations and also should take into account the local situation. (Henryk, 
2013, p. 420) 
 
According to the "Design Code of General Layout for Sea Ports" (JTS165-2013) 
issued by the Ministry of Transport of China in 2013, it requires traffic control and 
boats escort when LNG carrier navigating in port water area. In addition to the escort, 
other ships should keep at least 1 nm from the navigating LNG carriers. In practice, 
to ensure the navigational safety of LNG carrier, most of ports have established their 
own escort regime and moving safety zones. (Design Code of General Layout for 
Sea Ports 2013) 
1.4 Methodology and data resources 
The study methods used in this paper include: 
(1) Using general statistical analysis and cross analysis to analyze the accident data; 
(2) Using the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) method recommended by IMO to 
analyze the navigational risks of LNG carrier in port; 
(3) Using the theory of ship domain in the field of Marine Traffic Engineering to 
calculate and determine the scope of Moving Safety Zone.  
 
The data in this paper are mainly derived from: 
(1) International Maritime Organization（IMO）； 
http://www.imo.org/ 
(2) The International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers（GIIGNL）； 
http://www.giignl.org/ 





(4) CH·IV International； 
http://www.ch- iv.com/ 
(5) Center for Energy Economics (CEE)； 
http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/ 
(6) United States Department of Energy (DOE)； 
https://energy.gov/ 
(7) BP Amoco； 
https://www.bp.com/ 
(8) International Gas Union (IGU)； 
http://www.igu.org/ 
(9) Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF). 
https://www.ocimf.org/ 
1.5 Structure of paper 
In this research paper, the properties of LNG carriers and cargos are firstly 
introduced in chapter 2. Then, the data of 170 LNG carrier accidents collected from 
1964 to 2017 are analyzed, and the conclusion of most accidents happened in port is 
drawn in chapter 3. Subsequently, in the chapter 4 the Formal Safety Assessment 
(FSA) is carried out to prove the conclusion and to analyze the navigational risks of 
LNG carriers. Furthermore, it is concluded that the risk of collision between LNG 
carriers and merchant ships is a medium risk and should be controlled. In chapter 5, it 
is decided to reduce the probability of collision by establishing the Moving Safety 
Zone, and to mitigate the severity of consequence of the accident by setting the 
Leakage Hazard Zone, and to protect the two zones by means of tugs or boats escort. 
Simultaneously, through the studies on the theory of Ship Domain and the empirical 




the scope of Moving Safety Zone can be quantitatively calculated and obtained. On 
the other hand, the pool fire experimental results of Sandia National Labs are used to 
classify 3 categories of Leaking Hazard Zones of LNG carrier. Finally, the general 
standards, requirements, plans and supports for tugs or boats escort are recommended 









LNG and LNG carrier 
2.1 Properties of LNG 
2.1.1 Physicochemical properties 
Methane is the main component of Natural gas. It is classified as Class 2.1 dangerous 
goods in "International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code" (IMDG Code), which is 
with the properties of colorless, odorless, non-toxic, flammable, incorrosive, soluble 
in oil, but insoluble in water, softening rubber, etc. Under a standard atmospheric 
pressure, the gaseous density is 0.7174kg/m³, the relative density of 0.5548 (relative 
to the air density), lighter than air; it can be liquefied either by compre ssing or by 
cooling; the boiling point is -161.5℃. 
 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is obtained by cooling the natural gas under an 
atmospheric pressure to -162℃, so that to facilitate storage and transportation. 1m³
LNG gasification can be about 600m³ of natural gas (Nakazawa, 2016, p.60). The 
liquid density of LNG is about 45% of the water density; it will float on the surface if 




2.1.2 Leaking hazards  
(1) Pool fires. If LNG spills occur near an ignition source, a mix of the evaporating 
gas and air will burn above the LNG pool. Such pool fires are intense and burn far 
more rapidly and hotly than e.g. oil and gasoline fires. Furthermore, they cannot 
easily be extinguished and all the LNG must normally be consumed before they go 
out (IMO, 2007, P.8). Methane flammable range is between 5% and 15% (CEE, 2012, 
p.14), as shown in Figure 2.1. For methane vapors derived from LNG, with a fuel-air 
mixture of about 10 percent methane in air and atmospheric pressure, the 
autoignition temperature is above 1000°F (540°C) (CEE, 2012, p.15). 
 
Figure 2.1 - Flammable Range for Methane (LNG) 
Source: CEE. (2012). LNG safety and security. Retrieved June 2, 2017 from the World Wide Web: 
http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/LNG_Safety_and_Security_Update_2012.pdf 
 
(2) Cryogenic temperatures. LNG is produced by cooling down the natural gas to 
-162°C. If it is released, direct contact with the cryogenic liquid will freeze the point 
of contact and damage tissues of humans, animals and aquatic fauna. Embrittlement 
leading to structural failure and equipment damage may also occur when materials  





(3) Asphyxiation. Because the volume of LNG is only 1/600 of the volume of natural 
gas at atmospheric pressure, a non- ignited LNG vapor could displace breathable air 
(IMO, 2007, p.8), causing the oxygen content in the air to drop rapidly. If the oxygen 
content in the air is less than 15%, the human behavior will be affected. If the oxygen 
content is reduced to below 6%, the person in this air will die. 
(4) Rapid Phase Transition. LNG leakage occurs and contacts with water, because the 
density of LNG is smaller than the water’s, it will float on the surface of water. If a 
large number of LNG leak to the water, it may vaporize too quickly causing a rapid 
phase transition (RPT) (CEE, 2012, p.19). Such a rapid phase transition might have 
the potential to shatter windows and glass nearby but is only assumed to constitute a 
minor hazard to nearby people and structures (IMO, 2007, p.8).  
(5) Explosion. LNG is obtained by low temperature treatment at atmospheric 
pressure, so the damage to the cargo hold cannot cause an explosion. However, if the 
LNG inside the containment system is affected by an external fire source, the 
pressure in the tank will increase rapidly, eventually causing the explosion. This is 
called the Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Expansion (BLEVE). According to 
record, LNG carrier has not suffered such incidents, but liquefied petroleum gas 
storage tank had such an accident. (Alderman, 2005, p. 147) 
2.2 Specialties of LNG carrier 
2.2.1 General specialties 
(1) High construction cost. LNG carriers transport LNG with -162 ℃  low 
temperature, such ship is a high-tech, high challenge and high value product, single 
carrier cost about 200 million US dollars. 




a gas carrier intended to transport the products that require significant prototypes to 
preclude their escape. (International Code for the Construction and Equipment of 
Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk [IGC], 2014, p. 17) 
(3) Gigantism. In recent years, due to the strong competition of LNG world trade, the 
loading capacity of single LNG carrier is continuously increased. At present the 
largest Q-Max type LNG carrier loading capacity has reached 260,000m3.  
(4) High freeboard. Due to the special structure of LNG cargo hold, the freeboard of 
carrier is higher than ordinary ships, so the impact of wind and current will be more 
obvious than others. At the same time, due to the small density of goods, the center 
of gravity of LNG carrier would also be higher after loading. 
2.2.2 Structural features 
Depending on the different cargo containment system, LNG carriers engaged in 
ocean-going transport are dominated by two types of design, spherical type and 
membrane type. Both spherical and membrane carriers are double-hulled, equipped 
with 4-6 cargo tanks and no longitudinal bulkheads. 
(1) Spherical type LNG carrier (Moss type): the patent of spherical tank belongs to 
Norway Moss Maritime Corporation (http://www.mossww.com), which launched in 
1973 for the first time. The cargo tank is made of aluminum alloy, and the shape is a 
sphere. The wind effect is strong to the carrier due to the high freeboard and tank 
shape. It is difficult to maneuver with low ship’s speed, and the blind area in front of 





Figure 2.2: Side view of spherical type LNG carrier 
Source: Retrieved June 2, 2017 from the World Wide Web: http://www.wikiwand.com/fr/Méthanier 
 
(2) Membrane type LNG carrier: the patented technology is developed by the French 
company Gaztransportz & Technigaz (GTT) (http://www.gtt.fr). The main models 
are Mark III and No.96. The loading capacity of cargo tank is large, and the wind 
effect is small on deck, the view from bridge is better than Moss type. But the height 
of LNG in tank is limited due to sloshing effect (CEE, 2012, p.19). 
 
Figure 2.3: Side view of membrane type LNG carrier 
Source: Retrieved June 2, 2017 from the World Wide Web: http://www.wikiwand.com/fr/Méthanier 
 
2.2.3 Maneuvering characteristics 
(1) Large blind area, significant impact from wind and current. Due to the structural 




more difficult. On the other hand, LNG carrier has higher freeboard and wider body. 
When encountered with strong wind or current, the impact will be more obvious than 
ordinary ships.  
(2) Big inertia force due to the gigantism of ship. One of the common characteristics 
of large ships is the large inertia force, coupled with the structural characteristics of 
LNG carriers, which led to the ship's longer stopping distance.  
(3) Bad rudder efficiency. Compared with ordinary ships, LNG carrier has relatively 
poor rudder efficiency. Especially in the case of full loaded, LNG carrier's huge 
inertia will affect the ship’s steering; prolong the reaction time of course altering. As 
a result, the officers or captain of LNG carrier are required to take measures earlier; 
when at the low speed, they are required to take a large steering angle to overcome. 
(4) Poor heading stability. LNG carriers, especially large LNG carriers, are relatively 
poor in heading stability. Some of LNG carriers are equipped with bow thruster, but 
the power is often not enough. 
 
In summary, the LNG carrier's maneuverability is relatively poor, and considering 
the high risk of LNG cargo, it needs larger water area for buffering. So the safety 
zone is set in some ports, and patrol boats and tugs escort are very necessary. 
2.2.4 LNG fleets 
At the end of 2016, the total LNG tanker fleet consisted of 478 vessels at the end of 
2016. It included 24 FSRUs (Floating Storage and Regasification Unit) and 30 
vessels of less than 50,000 cubic meters. Total shipping capacity at the end of 2016 
stood at 69.3 million cubic meters. Total operational capacity (vessels that are known 
to be in service) amounted to 64.7 million cubic meters (GIIGNL, 2017, p.12). 10 




with 33 new orders placed in 2015. This is the lowest number of new orders since 
2010. At the end of 2016, the order book comprised of 137 carriers, 121 of which 
were above 50,000 cubic meters. 64 vessels were scheduled for delivery in 
2017(GIIGNL, 2017, P12).  
 
For the ship’s type, at the end of 2016, there were 337 membrane type LNG carriers, 
115 moss types and only 26 other types. In the case of loading capacity, 349 LNG 
carriers (73%) were within the loading capacity of 90,000-170,000 m3, 90 ships were 
Q-Flex and Q-Max (19%) models. In terms of age, the average age of current fleet is 
about 11 years and nearly 60% of ships are below 10 years and nearly 80% of ships 
are less than 15 years old. The following figure 2.4 gives more details. 
 
Figure 2.4: LNG fleets at the end of 2016 
Source: GIIGNL. (2017). annual report 2017. Retrieved June 2, 2017 from the World Wide Web: 
http://giignl.org/sites/default/files/PUBLIC_AREA/Publications/giignl_2017_report_0.pdf 
 
At present, the world's largest LNG shipwners include Qatar Gas, Petronas, Teekay 




fleet of Qatar Gas consists of 63 wholly- and jointly-owned LNG, and has a 
combined carrying capacity of over 8.5 million cubic meters or 15% of the world 
capacity (http://www.nakilat.com.qa/Page/Vessel). Teekay Shipping. Up to May 2017, 
its LNG fleet includes 32 wholly-owned carriers and other 18 newbuildings are on 
order, and has a combined carrying capacity of over 5.5 million cubic meters or 9% 
of the world capacity (http://teekay.com/fleet/).  
2.3 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, the hazards of LNG transportation are introduced from the aspects of 
LNG cargo and carrier respectively, the structural features of LNG carrier are 
explained and the present LNG fleets in the world are introduced. Meanwhile, the 










Data analysis  
3.1 Scope of data collection 
The LNG carrier accident data collected in this paper is mainly composed of two 
parts: 
(1) Most of the accident data is derived from a document “FSA − Liquefied Natural 
Gas (LNG) Carriers − Details of the Formal Safety Assessment” (MSC 83/INF.3) 
issued by IMO. The report was submitted by the Government of Denmark in 2007 to 
conduct a risk assessment of LNG carriers in accordance with today's highly 
respected Formal Safety Assessment (FSA). In the report, Erik Vanem and Rolf 
Skjong et al. collected a total of 182 incidents and accidents related to LNG carriers 
with more than 62,000 GRTs from 1964 to 2005 (including 2005), in which 24 
accidents were caused in the process of ship’s construction, dock maintenance, pirate 
attacks, towing, trial flights, so they were removed. The remaining 158 incidents and 
accidents were taken as standard samples and were analyzed in detail in the report. 
(IMO, 2007, p.5) 
(2) After 2005, the LNG carrier market had experienced several delivery peaks. The 
number of fleets had grown from just exceeding 200 (2006) to 478 (2017). Due to 
the influence of market supply and demand and ship’s gigantism, many advanced 




far-reaching for the safety of LNG carriers in the future. In order to reflect the rapid 
growth of the number of LNG carriers in the past 10 years and consider the safety 
improvement brought by advanced technology as far as possible, this paper collected 
13 cases of LNG carrier incidents and accidents (see appendix) from the beginning of 
2006 to the early of 2017. One of them is removed because of pirate attack. The 
remaining 12 accidents, combined with the 158 incidents collected from the IMO 
report, total 170 LNG carrier accidents are analyzed in this paper. 
3.2 Overview of statistical indicators 
The following 3 statistical indicators are selected to analysis the accident data of 
LNG carriers: 
(1) Accident time. Refers to the year when the accident occurred, which can better 
reflect the time distribution of the accidents. Every five years is a time period in this 
paper;  
(2) Ship status when accident occurred. A complete LNG carrier voyage cycle 
includes: loading at LNG export terminal, followed by long distance sailing to LNG 
receiving terminal, after unloading at the receiving terminal, back to the export 
terminal. The main operations of the LNG carrier during the whole period can be 
divided into Loading/Unloading, Maneuvering in port, Mooring/Anchoring, En route 
and others (incomplete records). (Chen, 2015, p.21) 
(3) Accident types. In this paper, the types of LNG carrier accidents are divided into 
7 categories (in IMO MSC 83/INF.3 report, the types of accident were classified into 
8 categories. In this paper, combine the collision with contact as 1 category), which 
are: cargo leaking while loading and unloading (L/U), collision or contact (Col/Cnt), 
grounding (Grd), fire or explosion (FE), ship equipment failure (EM), heavy 




3.3 Summary of overall accidents 
A total of 170 LNG carrier accidents from 1964 to 2017 are collected in this paper. 
Figure 3.1 shows the time distribution of accidents as per 5-year interval (only 4 
years from 2014 to 2007). The number of historical accidents experienced a rapidly 
increase from the early of 1970s. After 10 years, around the year of 1980, it reached 
the peak and then declined suddenly. Until the beginning of 1990s, it recovered to the 
level of the early of 1970s, which was around 10 accidents every 5-year. Finally, it 
stabilized below 10 accidents in each period.  
 
Since the LNG carrier was officially put into operation in 1964, the number of LNG 
carrier accidents increased from less than 10 accidents per 5 years to 70 accidents 
around the early of 1980s. Then the number surged to the historical peak (70 
accidents from 1979 to 1983), accounting for 41.2% of the total number, and soon 
dropped in the beginning of 1980s. However, the overall number of accidents in 
1980s was still higher than other periods. In the 1990s, the trend of LNG carrier 
accidents tended to be stable, approximate 10 accidents in each 5 years. After 
entering the 20th century, in every 5 years the number of accidents further dropped to 
the single digits. In the total 170 accidents, there were 28 accidents of LNG cargo 
leakage; all the accidents did not result in death of crewmember. If separating the 
location of the 170 accidents into in port and en route, there were 113 cases happened 
in port, 42 occurred en route, and other 15 accidents cannot be inferred through the 
records. It is clear that the number of accidents occurred in port is significantly larger 





Figure 3.1: Number of LNG carrier accidents per 5 years, 1964-2017 
 
Some experts had expressed doubts about the surge in accidents from the late 1970s 
to the early 1980s, and they had also analyzed the phenomenon in the assessment 
report submitted to the IMO by the Danish government, believing that “Possibly, the 
relatively high number of casual occur from 1976 to 1985 may be due to 
underreporting of accidents by periods and do not necessarily mean that the actual 
number of which was very much higher in this period (E.g. information about merely 
four incidents occurring during the years 1991-1995 seems very low). (IMO, 2007, 
p.21) 
3.4 Statistical analysis 
3.4.1 Accident time 
The period of 1974-1988 had experienced the highest frequency of LNG carrier 




37 accidents every 5 years, much more than other periods with the average level of 
7.5 accidents every 5 years. The main reasons for causing this situation may be found 
in the aspects of technology, management and personnel qualification. 
(1) The design and construction technology for LNG carrier at early day was in an 
experimental and initial stage. There are Conch type, Esso type and Worms type  
LNG carriers (collectively referred to as "other types") before the occurrence of 
Membrane type and Moss type. France's Gaz Transport No.82 membrane type LNG 
carrier first appeared in 1969, France's Technigaz's Mark I  type membrane type LNG 
carrier was first introduced in 1972, and Norway’s Moss Maritime's first moss type 
LNG carrier was built in 1973. Compared with other types, they are more advanced 
in technology and safer for crew. 
(2) At the beginning of 1980s, although the fleets of LNG carriers were continuously 
increasing, the conventions or norms for LNG carrier design and construction, LNG 
cargo handling and personnel training had been delayed. The design and construction 
of the original LNG carrier was in accordance with the requirements issued by 
classification societies. And when it became aware of the need for a globally 
harmonized rule, IMO established “the International Code for the Construction and 
Equipment of Liquefied Gases in Bulk (IGC)”, which adopt as the mandatory 
amendments to the SOLAS Convention and entered into force at 1 July 1986. This 
convention significantly promoted the safety management level of LNG carriers. 
(3) The above two points are more from the view of "ship". For controlling the 
“human factors” in LNG carrier accidents, except the requirements of IMO 
Convention, some standards and guidelines issued by committees and organizations 
are also contributing. The Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal 
Operators (SIGTTO) was established in 1979 with an initial 13memberships 
(http://www.sigtto.org). It was established to harmonize the safe operating standards 




experiences or work with other related organizations to develop technical 
specifications and operational guidelines to improve the operational safety of LNG 
carriers, terminals and personnel. Today, the members of SIGTTO control 97% of 
LNG carriers and terminals around the world. More than 50 books, guide lines and 
recommendations have been published, covering all aspects of LNG shipping 
industry. Similarly, Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) 
(https://www.ocimf.org/) was established in 1970, similar to the nature of SIGTTO, 
the members are major oil companies. In addition to the publication of the standards 
and guidelines, OCIMF also presented the Ship Inspection Report (SIRE) in 1993 to 
inspect the OCIMF members' ships in accordance with the SIRE procedure. The 
inspection is not only closely related to the management of the tanker, but also 
related to ship management and crew quality. SIGTTO and OCIMF's industry 
standards are usually subject to the IMO Convention. 
 
It can be seen that the most frequent occurrence of LNG carrier accidents was in the 
period of 1974-1988, which was just the time before IMO and those organizations 
launching the convention and guidelines. The number of LNG carrier accidents has 
been significantly reduced after the promulgation of the above rules and regulations. 
3.4.2 Ship status 
In this paper, when accidents occurred the status of LNG carriers are divided into 5 
categories, which includes Loading/Unloading, Maneuvering in port, 
Mooring/Anchoring, En route and others (incomplete records). Through the 
analysis to the selected 170 accident samples (as shown in Table 3.1), It is known 
that the number of the accidents occurred during cargo handling operations is the 




occurred during the ship Maneuvering in port, and 14 accidents occurred when ships 
were anchoring or mooring. The above status normally happened in port, totally 
accounting for 66.5% of the all accidents. 
Table 3.1- The overall distribution of LNG carriers’ status when accident 
occurred 
Operation  Occurrence No. Percentage Cumulative 
Percent 
    
Loading/Unloading 56 32.9% 32.9% 
Manoeuvring in port 43 25.3% 58.2% 
Mooring/Anchoring 14 8.3% 66.5% 
En route 42 24.7% 91.2% 
Others 15 8.8% 100% 
Total 170 100%  
Source：Primary data are derived from the IMO report “FSA − Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Carriers 
− Details of the Formal Safety Assessment” (MSC 83/INF.3) (2007) and the appendix of this paper 
 
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of ship’s status when accident occurred over every 5 
years. The accidents occurred during loading and unloading operations still rank the 
first, with an average of 5.1 accidents every 5 years. The accidents occurred during 
maneuvering in port changed significantly over the periods, with 79.1% occurred 
before 1989. The accidents occurred during anchoring and mooring were few and 
scattered. The number of accidents occurred during sailing en route and the number 
of the accidents occurred during maneuvering in port were almost the same, with 3.8 
accidents per 5 years. Sum up the accidents occurred in ports, we could obtain an 




number of accidents occurred outside of ports. Based on the above analysis, we may 
conclude that the accidents involving LNG carriers often occurred in port. 
Table 3.2- The every 5-year distribution of LNG carriers’ status when accident 
occurred  




Mooring/            
Anchoring 
En route Others Total 
       
1964-1968 3 0        0        1       1     5 
1969-1973 4 1        0        2       1     8 
1974-1978 6 3      3        2       1 15 
1979-1983 20 22      2       19     7    70 
1984-1988 9 8      2        4      2    25 
1989-1993 5 2      2        2      1    12 
1994-1998 2 2      0        2       0     6 
1999-2003 2 3      2        3      2 12 
2004-2008 2   2      0        3      0 7 
2009-2013 3 0      0        3      0 6 
2014-2017 0 0        3         1       0 4 
Total 56 43       14        42      15    170 
Source：Primary data are derived from the IMO report “FSA − Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Carriers 
− Details of the Formal Safety Assessment” (MSC 83/INF.3) (2007) and the appendix of this paper 
 
3.4.3 Accident types 




include cargo leaking while loading and unloading (L/U), collision or contact 
(Col/Cnt), grounding (Grd), fire or explosion (FE), ship equipment failure (EM), 
heavy weather (HW) and cargo containment system damage (CCS). The percentage 
and cumulative percent of the 7 types of accidents are shown in Table 3.3. The ship 
equipment failure (EM) (60 cases) was the most frequent accidents, accounting for 
35.3% of the total number of the accidents, followed by the collision or contact 
(Col/Cnt) accidents and cargo containment system damage (CCS) accidents, which 
also reached as many as 30 cases and 27cases respectively. The accidents of cargo 
leakage while loading and unloading (L/U) were also very frequent accidents, which 
were 24 cases. The frequency of fire or explosion (FE), grounding (Grd) and heavy 
weather (HW) were less than others, each only no more than 10 cases. Judging from 
the frequency of accidents, the most frequent two types of accidents were the ship 
equipment failure (EM) and collision or contact (Col/Cnt). 
Table 3.3- The distribution of the types of LNG carriers’ accidents 
Type 
 






    
EM 60 35.3% 35.3% 
Col/Cnt 30 17.6% 52.9% 
CCS 27 15.9% 68.8% 
L/U 24 14.1% 82.9% 
FE 10 5.9% 88.8% 
Grd 10 5.9% 94.7% 
HW 9 5.3% 100% 
Total 170 100%  




− Details of the Formal Safety Assessment” (MSC 83/INF.3) (2007) and the appendix of this paper 
 
3.4.4 Cross analysis 
Subsequently, a cross-analysis of the distribution of accident types and ship status are 
shown in Table 3.4: 







Mooring/            
Anchoring 
En route Others Total 
       
EM 19/26% 12/27.9% 4/28.6% 22/52.3% 3/20% 60 
Col/Cnt 2/4% 18/41.9% 3/21.4% 7/16.7% 0 30 
CCS 4/8% 3/7.0% 4/28.6% 9/21.4% 7/46.7% 27 
L/U 24/48% 0 0 0 0 24 
FE 7/14% 2/4.7% 0 0 1/6.7% 10 
Grd 0 5/11.6% 2/14.3% 3/7.1% 0 10 
HW 0 3/7.0% 1/7.1% 1/2.4% 4/26.7% 9 
Total 56 43 14 42 15 170 
Source：Primary data are derived from the IMO report “FSA − Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Carriers 
− Details of the Formal Safety Assessment” (MSC 83/INF.3) (2007) and the appendix of this paper 
 
As can be seen from Table 3.4, the most of categories of accident types occurred in 
the process of LNG carrier maneuvering in port (6 kinds of accident types had 
appeared), in which the most common type of accidents was collision or contact 




for 27.9%. The proportion of grounding (Grd) accidents also reached 11.6%. 
Through the cross analysis, it can be seen that due to the port limit, including narrow 
navigable waters and high density traffic, the mainly external threat to the safety of 
LNG carriers in port is collision risk. 
3.5 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, the author mainly analyzed the historical accident data of LNG 
carriers. Through the overview of accident trends and the analysis for the three 
statistical indicators (the accident time, ship status and accident types), the following 
conclusions are drawn: the number of LNG carrier accidents reached a peak around 
1980s, and then with the improvement of relevant technology and promulgation of 
mandatory conventions, the trend of accidents has been effectively curbed; In all 170 
incidents, the most of accidents occurred in ports, accounting for 66.5%. The 












4.1 Risk factors 
The influential factors to the safety of LNG carrier while maneuvering in port 
include but not limited to human factors, ship factors and navigational environment. 
4.1.1 Human factors 
Human factors mainly include the crew’s misoperation, carelessness and negligence 
etc., which could cause ship’s accident. It is widely believed that about 80% of 
marine accidents are caused by human factors. Therefore, it is very important to 
study the human factors and analyze the risks of personnel behavior in shipping and 
take corresponding preventive measures. In order to ensure the safety of LNG 
carriers while maneuvering in port and to reduce the impact of human factors, all 
crewmembers served on board a LNG carrier should hold the qualification 
certificates issued in accordance with STCW convention. In addition, the crew 
should also have the necessary safety knowledge and operational skills for LNG, 
hold the appropriate certificate of competency or special training certificate. 
4.1.2 Ship factors 




its seaworthiness are the prerequisite for safe navigation. Of course, the factors of 
ship itself include but not limited that whether the fire-fighting equipment, 
life-saving appliances, navigation equipment and other mechanical and electrical 
equipment are in good order. 
4.1.3 Navigational environment 
(1) Navigable waters. It refers to the safe place or space for ship’s movement, 
composed of port waters and waterways. The port waters include harbor basin, 
mooring area, anchorage, U-turn area, etc. The waterway is a lane with a certain 
depth, width, clearance height and bending radius which can be safely used for 
navigating. 
(2) Natural environment. It refers to the weather, hydrology, terrain condition, etc. 
Meteorological conditions include visibility, wind, water depth, current, tides, waves, 
freezing, etc.; terrain conditions include the width and bend of the waterway, uneven 
bottom, shoal reefs, etc. 
(3) Traffic conditions. It refers to the layout of the port and waterways, navigation 
aids and facilities, traffic flow and density, VTS management, etc. 
4.2 Identification of hazards 
The purpose of hazard identification is to identify a list of hazards and associated 
scenarios prioritized by risk level specific to the problem under review. This purpose 
is achieved by the use of standard techniques to identify hazards which can 
contribute to accidents, and by screening these hazards using a combination of 
available data and judgment (IMO, 2015, p.8). It is the first step of Formal Safety 
Assessment (FSA). The methods of hazard identification include identification of 




(1) Identification of possible hazards : The approach used for hazard identification 
generally comprises a combination of both creative and analytical techniques, the 
aim being to identify all relevant hazards.  And a coarse analysis of possible causes 
and initiating events and outcome of each accident scenario should be carried out.  
(IMO, 2015, p.8) 
(2) Ranking: The identified hazards and their associated scenarios relevant to the 
problem under consideration should be ranked to prioritize them and to discard 
scenarios judged to be of minor significance. (IMO, 2015, p.8) 
 
According to the results of LNG carrier accident statistics analysis in chapter 3 of 
this paper, and refer to other researches regarding the safety of LNG shipment, the 
hazards of LNG carrier navigating in port mainly include 3 categories and rank them 
as follow:  
(1) LNG carriers collide with other ships (LNG carrier collision);  
(2) LNG carriers contact with pier or other mooring ships (LNG carrier contact);  
(3) Navigational accident related to severe natural environment (Severe natural 
environment). 
4.3 Risk analysis 
After identifying the potential risks for LNG carrier navigating in ports, the risk 
value of each risk items should be quantitatively analyzed by use of accident and 
failure data and other sources of information as appropriate to the level of analysis. 
The risk analysis refers to the process of quantifying the probability of accident 
occurrence and the severity of accident consequence, which could be obtained by 
analyzing the historical accident data and estimating the loss of life and property. The 
procedure includes: analyzing the likelihood of occurrence of a risk event 




(consequence); calculating the risk value of the possible risk event.  
 
The risk analysis is estimated for all uncertainties and risk factors in the process of 
LNG carrier navigating in port. A comprehensive and systematic analysis of the 
probability of each risk and the severity of the consequence should be carried out. 
The main task of risk analysis is to rank the risk scenario. In the follow-up risk 
assessment, we need only to analyze the high risk and medium risk events in detail, 
ignore the low risk events, grasp the key points, and reduce the risk value. Therefore, 
the objects of the risk analysis for LNG carrier navigating in port are to analyze the 
individual risks, rather than the societal risks. 
4.3.1 The methods of risk analysis 
The methods of risk analysis include risk probability estimation method and risk 
consequence estimation method. The risk probability estimation is mostly based on 
statistical analysis and inference method. Statistical analysis refers to the historical 
statistical data or a large number of tests to estimate the probability, which is an 
objective estimate; inference method is that when the data is incomplete, experts 
based on experience, knowledge or similar events to infer the probability, which is a 
personal subjective judgment. Risk consequence estimation methods include 
probabilistic tree analysis, Monte Carlo simulation, etc. Mainly through the use of 
modern computer technology, the use of probability theory and mathematical 
statistics principles for probability analysis, indicating the severity of the risk. 
 
The risk is determined by the consequences and the probability. The risk matrix is 
an effective risk management tool which can achieve quantitative risk analysis by 




to establish a standardized matrix for the reference of ranking risk. Through proper 
quantifying and ranking the consequence and probability of risks, people can 
establish a standard matrix for the reference of an identified risk, and determine the 
rank of the risk. By ranking the risk, people can concentrated on the high and 
medium risk and ignore the low one. 
 
In this paper, the risk probability (P) is divided into 4 ranks, from 1 (Extremely 
remote) to 4 (Frequent), as listed in Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1- The frequency index of risk occurrence  
 
Source: Refers to the appendix 4 “Initial Ranking of Accident Scenarios” in IMO document “Revised 
Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO Rule -making Process” 
(MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12/Rev.1) (2015). 
 
The severity of consequences (C) is also divided into 4 ranks, from 1 (Minor) to 4 
(Catastrophic), see Table 4.2. Among them, the severity of consequence is related to 
property losses, personnel injuries and other factors. Because LNG leakage has little 
impact on the environment, environmental damage factors are not considered. 





Source: Refers to the appendix 4 “Initial Ranking of Accident Scenarios” in IMO document “Revised 
Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO Rule -making Process” 
(MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12/Rev.1) (2015). 
 
To facilitate the ranking and validation of ranking, it is generally recommended to 
define consequence and probability indices on a logarithmic scale. A risk index may 
therefore be established by adding the probability/frequency and consequence indices 
(IMO, 2015, p.39).  
 
In general: Risk (R') = Probability (P') * Consequence (C') 
So  
P '- actual probability, the corresponding probability rank is P, and P = log (P'); 
C'- actual consequence, the corresponding consequence rank is C, and C = log (C'); 
R'- actual risk, the corresponding risk rank is R, and R = log (R'). 
So it is possible to quantify the risk value using the following formula: R = P + C. 





The risk matrix for LNG carriers navigating in port is shown in Table 4.3 and the risk 
ranks are shown in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.3- Risk matrix 
 
Source: Refers to the appendix 4 “Initial Ranking of Accident Scenarios” in IMO document “Revised 
Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO Rule-making Process” 
(MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12/Rev.1) (2015). 
 
Table 4.4- Risk rank 
 
Source: Refers to the appendix 4 “Initial Ranking of Accident Scenarios” in IMO document “Revised 
Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO Rule-making Process” 
(MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12/Rev.1) (2015). 
4.3.2 Risk estimation 




estimated as shown in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5- Risk estimation of LNG carrier navigating in port 
Hazards Accidents & Incidents P C R 
LNGC collision 
LNGC collides with tug  2 1 3 
LNGC collides with barge 2 2 4 
LNGC collides with fishing boat 3 1 4 
LNGC collides with commercial ship 2 3 5 
LNGC contact 
LNGC contacts with obstruction 2 1 3 
LNGC contacts with wharf or other port constructions 1 2 3 
LNGC contacts with mooring ship 2 2 4 
Severe natural 
environment 
Severe weather 1 3 4 
Typhoon 1 3 4 
Earthquake 1 3 4 
Adverse tide or current 2 2 4 
Poor visibility 3 1 4 
 
 
In general, due to the uncertainties of small draft boats maneuvering in port, the 
probability of collision involving LNG carriers and them (e.g. fishing boats) would 
be reasonably probable, but to consider the little damage to large LNG carriers, the 
consequence is minor, so the risks is low. By contrast, although the probability of 
collision involving LNG carriers and other big merchant ships navigating in port is 
remote, the consequence would be severe, so the risk is medium. To consider the 
risks result from the severe natural environment like typhoon, the consequence 
would normally significant or severe. However, because the minor probability of 
occurrence of natural catastrophes and the weather is predictable, so the risk is low. 




is medium risk, which should be controlled. 
4.4 Risk control options 
For the medium risk, there are some effective measures and options to deal with. 
Through the proper service and management of port VTS, it can be controlled. And 
the mandatory pilotage is also a good choice. In this paper, the safety escort of LNG 
carrier in port would be discussed in the following chapter. 
4.5 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, the risk analysis for LNG carrier navigating in port is carried out by 
the mean of FSA. Firstly, the influential factors to the safety navigation of LNG 
carriers are introduced from three aspects: human, ship and environment. Secondly, 
according to the conclusion of chapter 3 the hazards to LNG carriers are identified. 
And then the risks of causing these hazards are quantificationally analyzed by using 
risk matrix. It is concluded that the risk of collision involving LNG carriers and other 
merchant ships in port is a medium risk and should be controlled. Finally, one of the 










According to the statistical analysis of LNG carrier accident in Chapter 3, it is known 
that the frequency of collision accident is the highest (accounting for 41.9%) while 
LNG carriers navigating in port. By the risk analysis in Chapter 4, it is concluded  
that the risk of collision involving LNG carriers and other merchant ships in port is a 
medium risk, which should be controlled. The risk estimation method described in 
Section 4.3.1 shows that the risk of an accident is determined by the probability and 
the consequence of the accident. Therefore, to reduce the risk, people have to 
minimize the probability of collision and the severity of consequence.  
 
A port authority could reduce the probability and the consequence of collision 
through establishing a traffic separation scheme to separate opposite traffic flows, 
and through establishing a port VTS to harmonize the traffic situation and to enhance 
the emergency response. The ship could reduce the probability and consequence of 
collision through using AIS, ECDIS and other advanced navigational equipment to 
assist collision avoidance, and through carrying out emergency drill to promote the 
safety awareness of crewmember. Of course, the implementation of safety escort for 
LNG carriers in port is also a good way to reduce the probability and the 
consequence of collision. In order to well organize the escort, two kinds of zones 




Leaking Hazard Zone. 
5.1 Moving Safety Zone 
5.1.1 Definition 
The Safety Zone of LNG carrier has always been an important concept in 
navigational safety management and research. In the process of LNG carrier entering 
and leaving the port, in order to protect its navigation safety, a certain range of waters 
is usually set around the LNG carriers. And some escort tugs are arranged at the 
boundary of the water area, to warn other ships in vicinity, and to avoid the entry of 
them, who would pose a threat to the normal navigation of LNG carriers. This area is 
commonly referred to as the Safety Zone of LNG carriers. Considering that the 
location and range of the zone would change with the movement of the LNG carrier, 
the zone is also known as the Moving Safety Zone, as shown in Figure 5.1. The 
establishment of Moving Safety Zone can effectively improve the navigation safety 
of LNG carriers and reduce the probability of collision accident. 
 
Figure 5.1: Sketch map of moving safety zone  
 
5.1.2 Reference 




lack of relevant research. Different countries and ports have various requirements, as 
shown in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1: Scopes of safety zone around LNG carrier 
 
Source: Various collections 
 
5.1.3 Ship Domain 
In 1963, Fujii, a pioneer of Japan Marine Traffic Engineering, developed the concept 
of Ship Domain in the study of the traffic capacity of a waterway, and released an 
article entitled "Traffic Capacity" in the British Journal of Navigation in 1971. In the 
article he defined the ship domain as the area around a ship where the most of other 
ships would avoid entering into (Fujii & Tanaka, 1971, p.545). Afterward, the British 
scholar Goodwin defined it as: an effective water area around a ship, where is 
necessary for the ship to maintain the navigational safety (Goodwin, 1975, p.330). 
Since then, British scholars Davis, Lewison, Goldwel, Abdel-Gali, Dutch scholar 
Van-der Tak and other scholars commenced to research and establish different type 
of mathematical model for ship domain and posed different views (Davis, Dove & 
Stockel, 1980, p.219). The theory of ship domain was developed gradually. 
 




Moving Safety Zone and the function is exactly the same. Therefore, we can quantify 
the scope of Moving Safety Zone by studying the domain of LNG carrier. 
5.1.4 Mathematical model  
Fujii conducted a series of marine traffic surveys in coastal waters of Japan and 
analyzed the two-dimensional frequency distribution of the relative position of the 
ships. The model of Ship Domain in coastal waters was obtained. It was an ellipse 
around the ship, as shown in Figure 5.2 (Wu & Zhu, 2004, p. 120). The long axis was 
about as long as 8 times of ship’s length (L) and the short axis was about 3.2 times of 
the length of the ship. When the ship navigated in port or narrow strait, the ellipse 
would shrink to 6L as the long axis and 1.6L as the short axis. 
 
Figure 5.2: Sketch map of Fujii model for Ship Domain 
Source: Wu, Z. L., & Zhu, J. (2004). Marine Traffic Engineering. Dalian: Dalian Maritime University 
Press. 
 
The scope of Ship Domain is affected by three factors, which are human factor 
(captain, officers, etc.), ship factor (speed, maneuverability, etc.) and external 




obtain by mathematic calculation. However, through the long-term observation 
method, people can draw a position distribution map around the observed ship, and 
obtain a blank area around her, where can be seen as the Ship Domain of the ship. It 
is indeed a more practical approach. In this paper, the model of Fujii Ship Domain 
is adopted to set the Moving Safety Zone around a LNG carrier. 
 
Most of Scholars' researches on the field of Ship Domain were concentrated in the 
1960s and 1970s. At that time the ship size and speed, traffic density, navigational 
equipment, communications equipment, safety management, etc. were quite different 
from present. The implementation of ISM greatly improved the level of ship safety 
management, effectively reducing the impact of human factors. Most of port waters 
are covered by VTS, which has already reduced the risk of collision significantly. On 
the other hand, in recent years, the ship's gigantism, high-speed trend is more 
obvious, the cost of ship and the sensitivity of port waters are also continuously 
increased. All of these factors will influence the scope of Ship Domain. Therefore, 
the scope of Ship Domain would be quite different from Fujii model. So the 
observed dimensions of Fujii model would be not adopted in this paper. It is 
intended to obtain the scope of Ship Domain by calculating and setting empirical 
parameters. 
5.1.5 Quantitative calculation 
The Ship Domain of a LNG carrier in port water area is set to be elliptical, and the 
long axis (Y-axis) of the ellipse is the ship’s course (over ground). Taking into 
account the research results of Fujii, Goodwin and other scholars, and for the 
convenience of calculation, the LNG carrier is placed in the center of ellipse, as 





Figure 5.3: Sketch map of ellipse model Ship Domains  
 
Assume that: M（x, y）is an arbitrary point on the ellipse; A (0，-a); F (0，a); S (b，
0); P (-b，0), so∣M F1∣＋∣M F2∣＝2a. The standard equation of the ellipse 






= 1  (a> b > 0), the coordinates of focuses is F1 (0, c), 
F2 (0, -c), and c
2=a2-b2. 
 
Assume that: the length overall of the LNG carrier is L (m), therefore the length of 
the long semi-axis of the ellipse: a=C*L (m); the length of short semi-axis: b=K*L 
(m). Thereinto: “C” is a long axis coefficient of Ship Domain, and; “K” is a short 
axis coefficient of Ship Domain. 
 
The value of a and b is related to the ship’s speed, draft, load capacity and local 
visibility, area, weather. The variation coefficients are assumed to be: speed 
coefficient (fS), draft coefficient (fD), load capacity coefficient (fL), visibility 




a=C*fS* fD * fL *fV*fA* fW*L (m)； 
b=K*fS* fD * fL *fV*fA* fW*L (m). 
 
The values of all coefficients are obtained by observation, statistical analysis, 
experiment and judgment of experts. The following Table 5.2 is introduced by the 
experts from Qingdao port, it is only for reference. 
Table 5.2- Scopes of coefficient value in Qingdao port 
Coefficients Scope Value Note 
C / 2-4 
Experimental data, according to 
port condition. In general, a port, 
with good navigational 
infrastructures, should choose a 
relatively small value. 
K / 1-3 
Experimental data, according to 
port condition. In general, a port, 
with good navigational 
infrastructures, should choose a 





5≤ Speed（kn）<6 0.6 
6≤ Speed（kn）<7 0.7 
7≤ Speed（kn）<8 0.8 
8≤ Speed（kn）<9 0.9 
9≤ Speed（kn）<10 1 
10≤ Speed（kn）<11 1.1 
11≤ Speed（kn）<12 1.2 
12≤ Speed（kn）<13 1.3 
13≤ Speed（kn）<14 1.4 
14≤ Speed（kn）<15 1.5 
15≤ Speed（kn）<16 1.6 
16≤ Speed（kn）<17 1.7 
17≤ Speed（kn）<18 1.8 
18≤ Speed（kn）<19 1.9 








Draft (m) <10 1 
experimental data 
10≤ Draft (m) <12.5 1.1 
12.5≤ Draft (m) <15 1.2 
15≤ Draft (m) <17.5 1.3 
17.5≤ Draft (m) <20 1.4 






1 Q-Flex & Q-Max LNG carriers 






1.5< Visibility (nm) 1 
experimental data 
1.2< Visibility (nm) ≤1.5 1.1 
0.9< Visibility (nm) ≤1.2 1.2 
0.6< Visibility (nm) ≤0.9 1.3 
0.3< Visibility (nm) ≤0.6 1.4 
0< Visibility (nm) ≤0.3 1.5 
fA 
Near berth 0.5 For other areas, select according 
to the water area of navigational 
availability. 
Vicinity of turning point 0.8 
Channel 1 
fW 
General weather 1 Severe weather is defined as: 
Wind speed ≥ 14 m/s (Moderate 
gale and above), or wave heigh 
≥ 2m, whichever is greater. Severe weather 2 
 
To determine the scope of Ship Domain (Moving Safety Zone) of a LNG carrier, 
firstly, the values of all coefficients should be chose according to the actual condition 
of local port, and then to obtain the length of a and b through the calculations. 
Secondly, the area of the ellipse can be obtained by the formula “ S = πab”. Finally, 
the coordinates of focus points F1, F2 and the arbitrary point M could be obtained, 
and the boundary of Ship Domain is determined. 
5.1.6 Example verification 
Taking the port of Qingdao as an example, as the top 10 ports in the world, there are 




carriers. assuming that a full loaded Q-Max type LNG carrier with a loading capacity 
of 260,000 m3 is navigating in the port, the ship length overall is 300m, the breadth is 
50m, the draft of the ship is 15m, fairway speed 12kn and slowdown to 6kn before 
berthing, visibility is good, normal weather conditions. The scopes of its ship domain 
in the fairway and arriving berth are calculated by the formulas in 5.1.5 and shown in 
Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: Dimensions of ship domain for Q-Max LNG carrier in Qingdao port 
Position a (m) b (m) area (km2) 
In channel 1521 761 3.6 
Arriving berth 819 410 1.1 
 
As can be seen in table 5.3, the distance from the ship’s head to the forward 
boundary of Moving Safety Zone is “ a − L/2 = 1371m ≈ 0.74nm”, the same as 
the aft; the distance from each ship’s side to the abeam boundary of Moving Safety 
Zone is “b − B/2 = 736m ≈ 0.4nm”. This scope is similar to the requirements in 
Shenzhen port and Taiwan port as shown in table 5.1. Therefore the calculation 
method is practicable. 
5.2 Leaking Hazard Zone 
5.2.1 Definition 
The Leaking Hazard Zone is the area where may be threatened by LNG pool fire if 
LNG leakage occurred from a LNG carrier. When the LNG carrier accident is in the 
unknown stage, or has clearly identified LNG leakage, in order to protect the safety 
of life and property around the LNG carrier, the Leaking Hazard Zone should be 






According to the report of Sandia National Labs issued in 2004 “Guidance on Risk 
Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Spill Over 
Water”, the Leaking Hazard Zone of a LNG carrier may be determined by the heat 
flux in the unit area (Hightower, 2004, p.74). The hazard area is divided into 3 zones 
according to the heat flux and damage (see Table 5.4). 






Zone 1 ≥ 37.5 
Thermal radiation could pose a severe 
public safety and property hazard 
Zone 2 37.5--5 
Thermal radiation transitions to less severe 
hazard levels to public safety and property 
Zone 3 ≤ 5 
Thermal radiation poses lesser risks to public 
safety and property 
Source: Hightower, M., et al. (2004). Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large 
Liquefied Natural (LNG) Spill Over Water (Sandia National Laboratories) . Retrieved June 7, 2017 
from the World Wide Web: http://prod.sandia.gov/techlib/access-control.cgi/2004/046258.pdf 
 
The scope of the 3 types of hazard zones is related to the quantity of LNG leakage. 
According to the Sandia National Labs research, in normal circumstances, for 
accidental LNG spills, the damage hole of the cargo containment system would be 
in the range of 0.5-1.5m2, the range of Zone 1 is about 250m around the ship; Zone 2 
is in the range of 250-750m around the ship and Zone 3 is around the ship more than 
750m. For a large number of intentional LNG spills (e.g. terrorist attack), the 
damage hole of the cargo containment system would be in the range of 5-7m2, and 
Zone 1 is about 500m around the ship; Zone 2 is in the range of about 500-1600m, 




5.3 Escort operation 
In order to ensure the safety of LNG carriers, the escort tugs shall, during the course 
of the inbound and outbound navigation of LNG carrier, be arranged at the boundary 
of the Moving Safety Zone to warn the other ships. 
(1) Escort tugs should maintain a good navigation order in the fairway and control 
the traffic flow in vicinity of the LNG carrier to ensure the clear of fairway; 
(2) Escort tugs should label the boundary of the Moving Safety Zone of the LNG 
carrier in her RADAR or ECDIS, other ships are prohibited from entering into; 
(3) In the vicinity of the island and the high density traffic area, the escort tugs 
should evacuate the ships near the area in advance to ensure the clear of fairway for 
the navigational safety of the LNG carrier; 
(4) When the maneuverability of LNG carrier is restricted in port, the escort tugs 
should assist her to maneuver; 
(5) In the process of escort, the escort tugs should take emergency response to deal 
with any emergency. 
5.4 Communication mechanism 
To ensure the safety of LNG carriers and smooth the escort operations, the various 
organizations involved in escorting should establish a good communication 
mechanism to ensure real-time, barrier-free communication. 
(1) The port VTS center shall choose a radio dedicated channel which could 
communicate with the escort agency and boats, LNG terminal, LNG carrier and her 
pilot. 
(2) Before the LNG carrier enters or leaves the port, the LNG carrier should report to 
the port VTS center and confirms the navigation plan. The escort agency shall 




the LNG carrier’s arriving to clear the fairway. 
(3) If the other ships do not follow the orders issued by escort tugs, the escort tugs 
should call VTS center for assistance. 
(4) The navigational warning regarding escort operation should be broadcasted to 
other ships a few hours before, which would leave enough time for them to prepare 
for the situation. 
5.5 Escort tugs and personnel 
5.5.1 Power of escort tugs 
During the escort process, the LNG carrier's engine failure should be taken into 
account. The escort tugs should have the ability to provide sufficient support to 
ensure the effective control of the LNG carrier when it is out of control. 
 
According to the requirements in Chinese “Design Code of General Layout for Sea 
Ports 2013”, the necessary power of tugs to assist the ship maneuvering is calculated 
by the following formula. 
BHP = KQ  
Thereinto: BHP is the abbreviation of Break Horse Power (KW); K is a coefficient, 
when ship’s DWT>50000t，K=0.08; Q is DWT (t). 
 
For example ： a Q-Flex type LNG carrier (217,000m3), DWT is 121945.8t: 
BHP=0.08×121945.8=9755.7（kW）≈13267.7 horse power; a Q-Max type LNG 
carrier (266,000m3), DWT is 163922t: BHP=0.08×163922=13113.8（kW）≈17834.7 
horse power. The calculation is based on the condition of no wind and current, if in 





5.5.2 Standards of escort tugs 
(1) Speed. The speed of escort tugs should not be less than the speed of LNG carriers 
(rang from 8-12kn), therefore, the maximum speed of escort tugs should not be less 
than 12kn; 
(2) Navigational equipment: the Moving Safety Zone and the Leaking Hazard Zone 
should be labeled on the radar or ECDIS of escort tugs, so the navigational 
equipment has to be functional; 
(3) Fire- fighting. In case of LNG leakage emergency, one of the escort tugs should 
have the ability to fight the fire; and all the tugs should equip the funnel with fire 
dampers. 
5.5.3 Personnel 
Escort command personnel should be qualified and familiar with the escorting waters 
environment, familiar with the "International Regulations for the Preventing 
Collisions at Sea 1972", familiar with the properties of LNG and the specialties of 
LNG carrier, while he or she should have the good communication and coordination 
capabilities, good English. Meanwhile he or she should have the ability to identify 
the risks and hazards in the process of escorting and can take appropriate measures to 
control them. 
5.6 Escort plan 
The escort vessel shall be capable of marking the Moving Safety Zone and the 
Leaking Hazard Zone of the LNG carrier. The boundaries of the two zones are set in 
accordance with the standards of 5.1.5 and 5.2.2 of this chapter respectively. 
According to the scope of Moving Safety Zone and the requirements of the escort 




conditions. The plan A is prepared for a better sea condition and the plan B is 
prepared for a harsh sea conditions. 
(1) Plan A: 3 escort tugs needed, one is for the guide, and the other two are for the 
maneuver. One of which is a fire- fighting tug. In the process of escorting, the tugs 
should be positioned at the boundary of the Moving Safety Zone. With the gradual 
reduction of LNG carrier speed, the range of Moving Safety Zone should be reduced 
accordingly. 
(2) Plan B: 4 escort tugs needed for harsh sea condition in case of emergency. Others 
are the same with Plan A. 
 
Figure 5.4: Sketch map of escort tugs or boats positioning 
 
5.7 Escort supports 
(1) The local rules or regulations should be established by port authority or maritime 
administration to normalize the escort operation.  
(2) The escort agency shall have the qualification of escort, its qualification and 
ability should be recognized by port authority or maritime administration.  
(3) An integrated emergency response plan should be established by all agencies 




designate a person to maintain and improve it. The content of the emergency 
response plan should at least include the disposal procedure of LNG leakage and  
pool fire, the emergency evacuation plan, the responsibility of each agency, etc. 
(4) An LNG related experts group should be established and maintained to ensure to 
receive proper and correct expertise in the event of emergency. 
5.8 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, to minimize the probability and consequence of the collision 
accidents involving LNG carrier and other merchant ship in port, the author mainly 
studies the establishment of LNG carrier Moving Safety Zone and Leaking Hazard 
Zone. The model of Fujii Ship Domain is adopted as the mathematical model of 
Moving Safety Zone, and a method for calculating the scope is proposed. And then 
take the Qingdao port as an example to verify the reliability of the calculation model.  
Meanwhile, use the LNG pool fire test results of the United States Sandia National 
Labs to set up LNG carrier Leaking Hazard Zone. And some requirements, standards 
and supports for escort operation, communication mechanism, escort tugs and 









Conclusion and prospect 
In this research paper, the properties of LNG and the specialties of LNG carrier are 
firstly introduced. Then, the data of 170 LNG carrier accidents collected from 1964 
to 2017 are analyzed, and the conclusion of most accidents happened in port is drawn. 
Simultaneously, the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is carried out to analyze the 
navigational risks of LNG carriers and to prove the conclusion. Furthermore, it is 
concluded that the risk of collision between LNG carriers and merchant ships is a 
medium risk and should be controlled. It is decided to reduce the probability of 
collision by establishing a Moving Safety Zone around LNG carriers, and to mitigate 
the severity of consequences of the accident by setting the Leakage Hazard Zone, 
and to protect the two zones by means of tugs or boast escort. Through the studies on 
the theory of Ship Domain and the empirical coefficient, the mathematical model of 
Moving Safety Zone is introduced, by which the scope of Moving Safety Zone can 
be quantitatively calculated and obtained. On the other hand, the pool fire 
experimental results of Sandia National Labs are used to classify 3 categories of 
Leaking Hazard Zones of LNG carrier. Finally, the general standards, requirements, 
plans and supports for tugs or boats escort are recommended to enhance the 





All in all, the conclusions of this research paper are as follows: 
(1) The LNG carriers face with the most of safety risks while navigating in port and 
through the Formal Safety Assessment the risk of collision with other merchant ship 
is determined as a medium risk which should be controlled. 
(2) Propose the methods to control the collision risk. One of them is to isolate the 
LNG carrier from other ships through establishing a Moving Safety Zone, which can 
reduce the probability of the accident. And another one is to setting a Leaking Hazard 
Zone to reduce the severity of consequence of the accident. The two zones should be 
protected and maintained by escort tugs or boats. 
(3) Put forward a mathematical model of Moving Safety Zone according to the 
theory of Ship Domain, and calculate the scope by setting empirical coefficients; 
using the LNG pool fire test results of the United States Sandia National Labs to set 
up 3 categories Leaking Hazard Zone. 
(4) Recommend two escort plans according to the sea condition, and discuss the 
standards of escort operation, communication mechanism, escort supports, escort 
tugs and personnel. 
 
With the continuous adjustment of the global energy structure, the share of Liquefied 
Natural Gas is increasing; the global LNG shipping industry will maintain a strong 
momentum in the next few decades. The study on the safety of LNG carrier 
transportation, including safety escort, would draw more attentions. The 
development of ship technology will be moving towards a more intelligent  and more 
economical direction, there is no exception to LNG carriers, and more likely in the 
leading position. Imagine that when an unmanned, LNG-powered LNG carrier 
navigates in the port water area, how to ensure her safety and the safety of port. On 
the other hand, the study on the Moving Safety Zone needs to be further discussed, 




Set the ship's Moving Safety Zone as if equip the ship with a safety cover, excluding 
the human factors, the intelligent computers will protect this cover by accurate 
calculation and auto-command the ship, almost all ship accidents can be avoided.. 
Finally, regarding the serious situation of global anti-terrorism, ship’s navigational 
safety can no longer be treated with the traditional way; many extreme situations 
need to be taken into account. In 2016, a Teekay's LNG carrier "Galicia Spirit" was 
attacked by armed terrorists using Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG). Fortunately, the 
ship was not seriously damaged, but it also sounded the alarm for us. Whether the 
future LNG carrier escort need to join the anti-terrorism considerations, which is a 
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Historic LNG carrier accidents with and without spillage of cargo （2006-2017） 
 
The following table contains a list of known past incidents involving LNG carriers. Both minor incidents and serious accidents are included, but incidents 
involving small LNG carriers, i.e. less than 6,000 GRT are left out. The source of information for the various incidents is g iven in the rightmost column. The 
shaded rows correspond to incidents that are considered out of scope. The incidents are categorized according to the following crude accident categories: 
• Collision: Col 
• Grounding: Grd 
• Contact: Cnt 
• Fire or explosion: FE 
• Equipment or machinery: EM 
• Heavy Weather: HW 
• Loading/Unloading: L/U 

























Incident description  
barrier. 
Source 






alongside and discharging her cargo at Savannah USA. 
An inbound tanker  passed astern in speed excess of 14 
knots. The close proximity caused the discharging vessel 
to vibrate. Cargo operation stopped. The accident resulted 
in both gangways being destroyed but there was no other 












No EM On 3
rd
 February  2007, the LNG tanker "IBRA LNG"  was 
on her way  to Qalat LNG Terminal. It was founded that 
the electrician was traoed in the elevator shaft. Rescue 










No No Grd On December 15, 2009, the liquid natural gas carrier 
Matthew grounded on coral reef habitat off the south 
coast of Puerto Rico near Guayanilla. The vessel was 








Membrane Unloading No No EM Bluesky, the TMT-controlled carrier was damaged at 
GDF Suez’s Montoir de Bretagne terminal in  France 
when a valve was by-passed and liquid passed into the 
gas take-off line during discharge operations. The damage 
sustained extended to part of the ship’s manifo ld and its 
feed lines without damage to the shore-side systems. No  











Spherical loading No No L/U During loading operations at the Bonny LNG terminal in  
Nigeria, LNG Edo took a significant list. The cause of the 
list was found to be abnormal ballast water d istribution in  
the ship’s tanks. The distribution in the ballast tanks was 
returned to normal and loading was co mpleted. There 
were no injuries and any pollution or damage. 







Membrane Unloading  No Yes EM On 1 March 2011, at port of Milfo rd haven, leakage of 
LNG during a discharging operation due to a defective 













No EM On the 13th September 2011, the LNG Carrier “LNG 
River Orashi” was on its way through the South Atlantic 
to Korea. When the Chief Officer, Cargo Engineer and 
Bosun inspected the ballast tanks as part of routine 
planned maintenance. The Chief Officer descended to the 










No No Col While transiting the Singapore Strait en route to Japan, 
the Qatari-chartered Al Gharaffa collided with the Greek 
Controlled, 10,114-teu Hanjin Italy. The LNG Carrier 
suffered severe bow damage, however there were no  
injuries, no damage to  the containment system, and no  
LNG was released.  












No No Grd At 1521 on 3 January 2014 the Liberia registered 
liquefied gas carrier, Navigator Scorpio, ran aground on 
Haisborough Sand in the North Sea. The vessel was 
undamaged by the grounding and there were no injuries 













No EM On 2 March 2015, a deck officer on board the LNG 
carrier, Zarga, suffered severe head injuries when he was 
struck by a mooring rope that had parted while 
repositioning the vessel at the South Hook LNG terminal, 










Membrane Tied up at 
jetty 
No No Col The UK’s Port  of Milford Haven confirmed that in  the 
early hours of Sunday morning July 10th, an incident 
occurred when its pilot vessel St Davids  made hard 
contact with LNG carrier Lijmiliya during a routine 














No No / The Teekay LNG carrier Galicia Sp irit was attacked by 
RPG fire on 8 nautical miles off Perim Island, Yemen. 
Heavy armed men in a skiff approached the vessel from 
the Yemen coast and fired an rocket p ropelled  grenade 
(RPG) over the large gas carrier. Fortunately, the vessel 
was not seriously damaged and the fire did  not caused 















Membrane Anchored at 
anchorage 
No No Col On 23 February 2017, while the 315m-long Al Khattiya 
was at anchor at Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates. It 
was hit by  Suezmax crude carrier Jag  Laadki, There have 
been no injuries or reports of pollution. Two of Al 
Khattiya’s ballast tanks were breached with a loss of 
some ballast water. 
http://www.lngworldnews.com/oil-tanker-hits-q-flex-lng-carrier-al-khattiya-off-fujairah/ 
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World 
News 
 
